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Bioethics Through a Disability Lens

C

urrently, most requests for clinical
ethics consultation involve endof-life issues. Should a feeding
tube or ventilator be withdrawn from a
dying person? Should a do-not-attemptresuscitation order be written without the
patient’s or surrogate’s consent? Should
a neonatal intensive care unit team oblige
a parent’s request to keep a severely
impaired neonate alive on maximum
life support despite probable mortality?
Since the field of bioethics arose to address dilemmas associated with emerging
life-prolonging medical technologies, it’s
not surprising that clinical ethics focuses
predominantly on end-of-life decisionmaking. But this has engendered widespread feelings of distrust among disability rights activists toward clinical ethics
consultants and the health care providers
they advise, whom they view as being
wholly ignorant of disability rights and
the social model of disability.*
In a session at the conference “Disability, Health Care & Ethics—What Really
Matters” on April 28th, co-sponsored by
Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee
Network (MHECN) and Kennedy Krieger Institute, I explored the origins of this
distrust as it relates to end-of-life care.
There is some commonality between
hospice/end-of-life care and disability
rights advocacy—both value holistic care
centered on maximizing an individual’s
quality of life; when possible, in a homebased setting. But the ultimate fear of
many hospice patients is dying alone and
in pain or other distress, whereas the very
real fear of many persons with a dis-

ability is dying too soon at the hands of
health care workers who do not see the
worth in prolonging their lives, and the
associated burdens and costs. Research
studies have corroborated the latter. Nondisabled persons and health care providers are more likely to rate the quality of
life of persons with disabilities as poor,
while individuals who have a disability
rate their own quality of life as good or
better (Bach & Tilton, 1994; Gerhart, et
al., 1994; Lule et al., 2009). Reasons that
persons with disabilities sometimes rate
their quality of life as poor often have
more to do with others’ negative attitudes
toward them, and barriers that exclude
them from meaningful work and social
activities, than to their mental or physical impairment(s). The unemployment
rate of 66% among persons with disabilities—unchanged for over twenty years—
is just one example of rampant disability
discrimination.
In 1991, Leonard Kriegel made the
argument on behalf of the disability community:
“Our complaint against society is
not that it ignores our presence but
that it ignores our reality, our sense
of ourselves as humans brave enough
to capture our destinies against odds
that are formidable. Here is where
the cripple and society war with each
other. If we were satisfied to be held
up for compassion, to be infantilized
on telethons, we would discover that
this America has a great deal of time
for us, a great deal of room for us
Cont. on page 2
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in a heart open to praise for its
own generosity. … In literature
… [and] on television as bathetic
as the stream of smiling children
paraded before our eyes as if their
palsy were Jerry Lewis’s reason
for living, what we invariably
discover is that our true selves,
our own inner lives, have been
auctioned off so that we can be
palatable rather than real. We
can serve the world as victim or
demon, the object of its charity or
its terror. But the only thing we
can be certain of is that the world
would prefer to turn a blind eye
and a deaf ear to our real selves—
and that it will do precisely that
until we impose those selves on the
world.” (pp. 65-66).
Kaufert and Koch (2003) present an
example of how disability bias influences end-of-life care in describing a
case involving a man with amyotropic
lateral sclerosis (ALS) who opted for a
tracheotomy and portable ventilator to
prolong his life. After the man’s wife

died, he made repeated requests that
his ventilator be stopped. The principle of respect for patient autonomy
was used to justify complying with his
wishes. The health care team believed
the man knew that stopping the ventilator would cause his death, and that
he was freely choosing to die. They
saw their role basically as following a
dying man’s request and palliating his
suffering. Kaufert and Koch, however,
suggest that this man may have chosen to die not based on an informed,
autonomous wish, but because he was
depressed at his wife’s recent death,
and fearful of living in an institution
due to the lack of a home caregiver
to help with his daily physical needs.
Instead of simply complying with his
wish to stop life support, Kaufert and
Koch argue that health care providers
were obligated to address this man’s
grief over his wife’s death and lack
of home support, present options for
social and community services to allow
him to remain in his home, and arrange
for him to meet with other long-time

The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a
membership organization, established by the Law and Health Care Program
at the University of Maryland School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is
to facilitate and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making
in health care settings by supporting and providing informational and
educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in
the state of Maryland. The Network works to achieve this goal by:
• Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate
ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to assist
their institution to act consistently with its mission statement;
• Fostering communication and information sharing among Network
members;
• Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other
healthcare providers, and members of the general public on ethical
issues in health care; and
• Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees
and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.
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DISABILITY BLOGS
ventilator users. They cite David Jayne
to portray the mainstream view that
prolonging the life of patients with
ALS causes undue burden not only on
the patient, but on others caring for the
patient. As Jayne stated, looking back
on his decision to have tracheotomy
surgery to allow for long-term ventilator use:
“My now ex-wife told me how
selfish I was for wanting to live.
That my young children had suffered enough and it would cause
them only more pain. It was a
sickening sense of abandonment.
I have absolutely no doubt if I did
not have the ability to communicate my desires the [tracheotomy]
surgery would not have taken
place.” (Jayne, 2005)
Discriminatory attitudes about
the quality of life of a person who
breathes with a ventilator need to be
challenged—whether for a person with
ALS or a spinal cord injury. Not doing
so reveals a disability bias that Kaufert
and Koch point out is pervasive among
health care professionals.
Similarly, Johnson (2006) compares
how most heath care providers and
bioethicists viewed the Terri Schiavo
case as an end-of-life case, whereas
disability rights groups like Not Dead
Yet viewed it as a disability rights
case. The former cited evidence supporting withdrawing Ms. Schiavo’s
feeding tube to include that she would
never recover from her persistent
vegetative state (PVS), that her g-tube
feedings were a medical treatment that
was delaying her death, that she did
not want to be kept alive in her condition, and that the burdens of keeping
her alive with the feedings outweighed
any benefits (Goodman, 2006).
Disability rights advocates such as
ADAPT (American Disabled for Attendant Programs Today), The ARC of
the United States, and Not Dead Yet

asserted that because PVS
Bad Cripple
is often misdiagnosed,
http://badcripple.blogspot.com/
one should err on the asDisability News
sumption that a person
http://www.patriciaebauer.com/
may have some level of
consciousness, even if the
Disability Studies, Temple University
person cannot commuhttp://disstud.blogspot.com/
nicate. They highlighted
Life with a Severely Disabled Child
that there was no hard
http://severedisabilitykid.blogspot.com/
evidence of Terri Schiavo’s
Media dis&dat
wishes, and that even if
she had completed a living
http://media-dis-n-dat.blogspot.com/
will, advance directives
Mysteries and Questions
are inherently disabilitySurrounding the Ashley X Case
biased (see Derbyshire &
http://huahima.wordpress.com/
Levy, July 2010). Advance
Planet of the Blind
directives require people
to state preferences for
http://www.planet-of-the-blind.com/
life-prolonging treatments
What Sorts of People
they might want in the
http://whatsortsofpeople.wordpress.com/
future, but studies show
that able-bodied persons
cal and mental disabilities. We can
often change their minds about their
support hiring policies that welcome
preferences for life-prolonging treatdisability activists, independent living
ments when they become disabled.
center organizers, and persons with
Most people with disabilities do not
disabilities. And we can examine our
view wheelchairs, ventilators, and
own fears and emotions surrounding
feeding tubes as medical devices—
death and disability that may influence
rather, they view them as empowering how we approach ethical decisionadaptive devices. And they take issue
making in health care. As Johnson
with the assumption many make that if (2006) wrote:
an individual cannot recover from an
“… Most people resist looking
impairment—such as PVS—this may
too
closely at the kinds of issues
justify withholding or withdrawing hythat await us when we lose the
dration, nutrition, or other life support
ability to communicate. We do
measures (Johnson, 2006).
not like thinking about disability
So, how can we health care providany more than we like thinking
ers and clinical ethicists better adabout death or end of life issues.
dress disability rights issues? For one,
We do not like facing the reality
we can increase our knowledge and
of incapacitated lives. If only we
awareness of disability perspectives.
could achieve a willingness to
Disability blogs are a good way to
raise the veil of denial about the
start (see Box above). We can ensure
shadow-world of brain damage
that there is adequate representation
and decision-making, it might
of disability perspectives on our ethics
serve as a legacy from the Terri
committees by including members
Schiavo ordeal.”
with knowledge about the social and
With health care reform underway,
medical models of disability, the hisand the prevalence of disability rising,
tory of disability rights advocacy, and
state resources for persons with physiCont. on page 14
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CURVES: A Mnemonic for Determining Medical
Decision-Making Capacity and Providing Emergency
Treatment in the Acute Setting
Grant V. Chow, MD, Matthew J. Czarny, BS, Mark T. Hughes, MD, MA & Joseph A. Carrese, MD, MPH
Department of Medicine and the Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics,
Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. Baltimore, MD
Note: This article is an abbreviated version of an article by the same title published in CHEST in February 2010
(137(2):421-427). This revised version is presented here with the written permission of the Editors of CHEST. The full,
original article can be found at http://chestjournal.chestpubs.org/content/137/2/421.full

T

he evaluation of medical
decision-making capacity
and provision of emergency
treatment in the acute setting may
present a significant challenge for
both physicians-in-training and
attending physicians. Although
absolutely essential to the proper
care of patients, recalling criteria for
decision-making capacity may prove
difficult during a medical emergency.
Furthermore, emergencies present a
particularly challenging situation for
assessing decision-making capacity,
as altered mental status is frequently
a confounding factor. Stakes may
be high, with the absence or delay
of treatment quickly leading to loss
of life or limb. In addition, discord
with regard to determination of
decision-making capacity may be
commonplace among medical staff
despite access to the same clinical
information and laboratory data. In
an emergency, therefore, it becomes
imperative that decision-making
capacity be assessed in an efficient
manner. Although several tools exist
that can assist in the evaluation for
capacity (Dunn, et al., 2006; Grisso,
et al., 1997), they frequently prove
cumbersome, time consuming, and
difficult to perform in an acute care
setting. Of equal importance to
determining capacity are recognition
of a true medical emergency and
recollection of the criteria required
to provide emergency treatment in
the absence of explicit informed
consent. This article presents two
4 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

cases that illustrate the need for
quick assessment of decisionmaking capacity and the criteria
for emergency treatment. It then
provides and demonstrates the use of
a mnemonic (CURVES: Choose and
Communicate, Understand, Reason,
Value, Emergency, Surrogate) that
addresses the abilities a patient must
possess in order to have adequate
decision-making capacity, as well as
when emergency treatment can be
provided without patient consent.
Clinical Cases
Case 1
Ms. S. is an 84-year-old woman
with a history of severe chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease
(COPD). She presents with a 1-week
history of progressively worsening
shortness of breath, cough, increase
in clear sputum production, and
wheezing. On examination, the
patient appears in extremis. Her
respiratory rate is 28, and she is using
accessory musculature to breathe.
There are diffuse, quiet wheezes
in her lungs bilaterally, with an
ominous lack of air movement. An
arterial blood gas reveals a markedly
decompensated respiratory acidosis,
and the overall picture appears
consistent with a life-threatening
COPD exacerbation. Hospital
admission with either noninvasive
positive pressure ventilation,
intubation, and/or comfort care
measures are presented to the patient
as the possible responses to her

situation. However, the patient states
“I want to die at home. Please, let me
go home.”
The doctors involved are faced
with the following questions: Should
the patient be discharged home, with
the knowledge that this will likely
result in her death? Does this patient
have adequate capacity to make this
decision?
Case 2
Mr. M. is a 53-year-old morbidly
obese man who was admitted for
suspected obesity hypoventilation
syndrome and obstructive sleep
apnea. The on-call physician is called
to his bedside emergently, after he
was found unresponsive to verbal and
noxious stimuli. Arterial blood gas
reveals a combination of hypoxia and
decompensated respiratory acidosis.
On lung examination, there is a
complete lack of respiratory effort,
and there are no breath sounds. The
patient is ventilated with a bag-valve
mask at maximal supplemental
oxygen, and he partially arouses, but
remains groggy. Respiratory effort
is somewhat restored, to a rate of
6 breaths/min. Bedside oximetry
increases to 89%. However, the
patient’s head begins to bob, and
it appears that he will soon lose
consciousness. Anesthesia is paged
for a stat intubation.
Two minutes pass, and anesthesia
arrives. The patient has become
more awake and is looking around
the room. His pulse oximeter is now

CHOOSE & COMMUNICATE – Can the patient
communicate a choice?
UNDERSTAND - Does the patient understand the risks,
benefits, alternatives, and consequences of the decision?

Does the patient have
decision-making capacity?

REASON – Is the patient able to reason and provide
logical explanations for the decision?
VALUE Is the decision in accordance with the patient’s
value system?

Can emergency treatment
without informed consent be
provided?

EMERGENCY – Is there a serious and imminent risk to
the patient’s well-being?
SURROGATE – Is there a surrogate decision-maker
available?

Fig. 1

reading 93%, although respirations
remain shallow and infrequent. Given
his significant respiratory acidosis,
the medical team prepares for
intubation. At this time, the patient
shouts “I don’t want a tube! No
tube!”
The doctors involved are faced with
the following questions: Should this
patient be intubated? Does he have
the capacity to decide his course of
therapy?

verbally, in writing, or through
the use of signals
•

o “In your own words, please
tell me about what we’ve
just discussed, regarding
your current illness and the
decisions we need to make.”

The CURVES Mnemonic
We propose a mnemonic, CURVES
(Choose and Communicate,
Understand, Reason, Value,
Emergency, Surrogate), to aid in
the evaluation of decision-making
capacity in an emergency. (Fig 1).
•

C – Choose and
Communicate. Patients must
be able to choose from among
the options before them.
Furthermore, their choice must
be made without coercion
or manipulation, although
appropriate persuasion is
permitted (Beauchamp &
Childress, 2001). Each patient
must be able to communicate
his or her preferences, whether

U – Understand. The patient
must understand the relevant
risks, benefits, alternatives,
and consequences of any
planned intervention or course
of action. The following
questions may be helpful in
assessing the patient’s degree
of understanding:

o “What do you think will
happen if you receive
(or do not receive) the
intervention?”
o “What do you understand to
be the alternative(s) to the
recommended plan?”
•

R – Reason. The patient must
be able to reason and provide
adequate explanations for
accepting or declining each
intervention.

•

V – Value. The patient’s
decision should be consistent
with his or her value system.

Physicians should strive to
be aware of and understand
the patient’s values, and they
must also be aware that patient
values and goals may change
with time. The following
question may be helpful in
determining the degree to
which the patient’s values are
playing a prominent role in the
decision being made:
o “How did you reach your
decision to accept (or reject)
the intervention, and what is
guiding your thinking about
this?”
If the patient lacks the ability
to choose and communicate,
understand, reason, or act
consistently with his/her
values (to a degree consistent
with the benefits and risks
of the decision), adequate
decision-making capacity is
not present. In such cases, the
physician must next determine
if emergency treatment should
be rendered, provided that two
additional requirements are met
(American College of Legal
Medicine, 2007; Dunn, et al.,
2006; Grisso, et al., 1997).
Cont. on page 6
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CURVES
Cont. from page 5
•

E – Emergency. A true
emergency exists; that is, there is
serious and imminent risk to life
or limb.

•

S – Surrogate. No surrogate
decision maker or legal
document detailing the patient’s
desires is immediately available,
and there is no time to obtain an
ethics consultation.

When both of these conditions
are present in the context of lack of
medical decision-making capacity,
a physician may intervene without
explicit informed consent, as long as
the proposed intervention would be
acceptable to a reasonable person or to
the patient if they were able to speak
for themselves. It is important to note
that such an action does not occur
in the complete absence of consent;
rather, the physician is operating under
the presumption of implied consent
(Derse, 2005).
Next we return to the cases and
use the CURVES mnemonic to work
through them and arrive at a plan of
action.
Case 1: Refusal of Hospital Admission
in a Life-Threatening COPD
Exacerbation
Ms. S. is found to be alert, oriented,
and vocal. The different courses of
action that may be taken (noninvasive
positive pressure ventilation,
intubation, and medically-supported
comfort care measures) are presented
to her, and she is able to repeat each
option, using her own words. She
states, “I don’t want a mask or tube. I
don’t want any machines. I just want
to die in my own home.” She voices
understanding that leaving the hospital
would result in worsened breathing
and possibly death. The patient’s adult
children, who were eventually found
in the Emergency Department waiting
room, corroborate both the reasoning
process and her decision as consistent
6 Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter

with previously stated preferences and
values.
Ms. S. should be allowed to return
home, even if that means she will die
there.
Case 2: Refusal of Intubation in
Hypercapnic Respiratory Failure
Mr. M. is able to slowly recite his
name, birth date, and location. He
explains his refusal of intubation by
stating: “I just don’t want it.” He
mumbles when asked to repeat, in
his own words, the risks, benefits,
or alternatives to intubation. He
cannot explain the consequences of
his refusal. Review of the patient’s
admission note reveals that he
previously desired intubation, if
medically necessary. No surrogate
decision-makers are immediately
available.
Emergency treatment in the
absence of informed consent should
be provided, and Mr. M. should be
intubated.
Summary
The process of approaching and
evaluating decision-making capacity
in the emergency setting may be
facilitated by recalling our proposed
mnemonic, CURVES. The physician
assesses decision-making capacity by
determining the patient’s ability to:
Choose and Communicate a course of
action; Understand the intervention’s
risks, benefits, alternatives, and
consequences; Reason and provide
logical explanations for the choice; and
apply his or her Values to the decision.
If these functional abilities are intact,
then under most circumstances,
the patient’s preferences should be
honored. If any of these functional
abilities are lacking, and the patient is
deemed not to have adequate decisionmaking capacity, then the physician
must determine if a true Emergency
exists and assess availability of a

Surrogate decision maker. If an
emergency situation is present and a
surrogate cannot be found in a timely
manner, then emergency treatment
may be provided for a medical
condition warranting intervention.
Acknowledgments
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Patients without Proxies:
What's happening in other states?
Cynthia Griggins, PhD, MA is co-director of the Clinical Ethics Service at University Hospitals in Case Medical Center, Cleveland,
Ohio. She summarizes here a hospital protocol she helped develop to make medical decisions for seriously ill (but not necessarily
terminally ill) patients who do not have an available surrogate decision-maker.

F

or some time we at Case Western Reserve Hospital have been
aware of a growing number of
unfortunate patients who arrive at our
teaching hospital, incapacitated and
requiring complex medical care, but
without anyone to serve as a surrogate
decision-maker. These patients are
sometimes elderly nursing home residents who have outlived all relatives.
Often they are homeless mentally ill
individuals who long ago lost all ties
to families or friends. Other times
they are isolated “loners” brought to
the hospital by a neighbor or acquaintance who is concerned but who lacks
either moral or legal authority to make
decisions for the patient. The patient
requires care for which consent is
necessary. It might be aggressive care

in an ICU, a major surgery, an amputation, or referral to hospice care, but
search for family turns up no one.
Decision-making is clear if the
situation is a true emergency: assume
consent and act to save life or limb. It
is also relatively clear if there is ample
time before a decision has to be made:
approach the court and request that
a guardian be appointed. However,
getting a guardian takes six to eight
weeks in our urban county, making
this approach untenable most of the
time. Even if it were possible to wait,
it would be cruel, costly, and unethical to allow a patient to go untreated
for that length of time, just as it would
be unethical to wait until the patient’s
condition worsened to the point of an
emergency, thus allowing physicians

to act without formal consent. Moreover, our overworked probate court
has neither the time nor the resources
to appoint “emergency guardians” to
make medical decisions.
Disturbed by the inconsistent manner in which decisions were being
made for these “patients without proxies (PWPs),” our hospital ethics committee decided to develop a protocol.
We began with several assumptions.
First, we felt that placing the burden
of decision-making on treating physicians posed an unacceptable conflict
of interest and could lead to unwanted
outcomes. An individual physician’s
bias can cause her to either overtreat
or undertreat a seriously ill patient.
Fear of lawsuits can result in defensive
Cont. on page 8

T

Case Western's Model and Maryland Law

he problem of “patients
without proxies” has troubled
clinicians and policy makers
for years. See, for example, Karp
N. and Wood E., “Incapacitated and
Alone: Healthcare Decision Making
for Unbefriended Older People,” Human Rights, Volume 31, no. 2 (2004),
20-24. Case Western’s innovative
approach should be seen as a promising pilot study.
Hospitals in Maryland that might
want to adopt Case Western’s model
should be aware, however, of differences in the legal context between
Ohio and Maryland. The Case
Western approach was initiated in
part because delays of many weeks in
guardianships compromised quality
care. If, by contrast, the circuit court

in a Maryland county responds in a
timely way to petitions for emergency
guardianship, a hospital in that county
may have no need for an interim informed consent mechanism.
But suppose that a Maryland hospital, like Case Western, sometimes
is troubled by delays in guardianship.
Before adopting Case Western’s approach, a Maryland hospital should
seek advice from its counsel about
how such a role for ethics committee
members fits within the framework
of Maryland law. In effect, ethics
committee members would serve as
surrogates who are not authorized as
such in the Health Care Decisions Act
(HCDA). Although neither the HCDA
nor other law explicitly prohibits clinician reliance on such an informed con-

sent mechanism, one effect would
be loss of the immunity granted by
the HCDA. Of course, the absence
of immunity does not equate to liability, and I myself doubt that most
cases of interim decision making for
an unbefriended patient pose any
real risk of liability for the clinicians
who accept the informed consent
or refusal of the ethics committee
members. Nevertheless, other lawyers may not agree. Consequently,
a Maryland hospital should proceed
cautiously before emulating Case
Western’s approach.
Jack Schwartz, JD
Visiting Professor and
Health Law & Policy Fellow
University of Maryland
School of Law
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Patients Without Proxies
Cont. from page 7
medicine rather than decisions made
in the patient’s best interest. Alternatively, without someone to advocate
for the patient, a physician may fail
to offer reasonable options or may
withdraw treatment too soon. Second,
we believed that decisions for PWPs
should not be made by employees of
the hospital. Again, conflict of interest was our main concern, but we also
believed that a lay person’s viewpoint
was needed to challenge and counterbalance the medically-based thinking
of the treatment team. Finally, we were
committed to transparency and accountability. Decisions for PWPs and
the process by which they were made
should be open and readily available
to examination by anyone who raised
legitimate questions.
With the help of the hospital attorneys, we researched our state law
to determine whether there were any
statutes to guide us or limit us in our
planning. State laws vary in providing
guidelines for making decisions for
patients without proxies; our own is silent on the matter. After checking with
the local probate court, adult protection agencies, and adult guardianship
programs (who all declined to take
on the task of decision-making for
hospitalized patients and gave us their
blessing), we received the hospital
administration’s approval to proceed.
Our own PWP protocol is built on a
model first proposed by the Veterans
Affairs (VA), with some modifications.
A small subgroup of the hospital’s ethics committee was formed, consisting
of community members who would
be readily accessible (within 24 hours)
for decision-making. These individuals, usually not medically-trained, but
versed in ethical decision-making, do
not work for the hospital. Currently
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the subcommittee consists of several
professors, psychologists, lawyers, and
a music teacher with some training in
bioethics.
The protocol states that the ethics
consultant on call and a social worker
be notified as soon as it is suspected
that a seriously ill and incapacitated
patient may lack a surrogate. The
social worker, with the assistance
of the ethics consultant, launches an
aggressive search for family, following all possible leads. They contact
nursing homes, neighbors, landlords,
local police, relevant service agencies,
and anyone who may know the patient, asking not only about relatives,
but also about the patient’s history,
lifestyle, values, and quality of life,
gathering information and preparing
for later discussions of what might
be in the patient’s best interests. For
example, nursing home staff may tell
us that despite her dementia, a patient
has been relatively active and content
in the nursing home, suggesting that
a return to baseline might be a desirable goal. Or a neighbor may tell us
that a patient has become increasingly
withdrawn and invalid since his wife’s
death, and has repeatedly stated that
he would not want to live in a nursing
home or be kept alive in a severely
disabled condition.
The intensive search for relatives is
extremely important. It has been successful with about 40% of patients first
thought to lack proxies. Not only has
it been a relief to staff to find surrogate
decision-makers, but it also has been
gratifying when we have been able to
re-unite estranged family members
who then provide support for an isolated patient. The search has, however,
turned up relatives who refuse to act
as surrogates, in which case we still

invite them to participate in decisionmaking to the extent that they feel
comfortable.
When it becomes clear that no
surrogate can be found, and a major
medical decision must be made for
the incapacitated patient, the ethics
consultant then convenes the PWP
committee. The consultant guides
them in reviewing the chart and briefs
them on background information
that has been gathered regarding the
patient’s lifestyle, values, and quality of life prior to hospitalization. The
committee members are encouraged
to meet the patient, and to whatever
extent possible, communicate with
her. The committee and ethics consultant then meet with the medical
team (i.e., the attending physician,
appropriate consultants, social work,
nursing, etc.), who present the patient’s medical condition, and various
treatment options, with risks, benefits,
and long-term prognosis articulated
as much as possible. The committee
then discusses the various alternatives
(including comfort care), focusing
not only on short term demands and
benefits, but also on long-term quality
of life. They then make a recommendation to the medical team regarding
which treatment plan they believe is in
the patient’s best interest. Usually this
process is accomplished in a single
meeting of one to two hours, although
occasionally a patient’s changing
medical status requires multiple meetings and communications. The ethics
consultant records all deliberations
and recommendations in the patient’s
medical record.
Because the PWP committee does
not have the legal standing of a proper
surrogate, their recommendation is just
that—a recommendation. As always,

the ultimate decision to deliver any
treatment, such as a surgery, chemotherapy, or even CPR, lies with
the attending physician. However,
in over 90% of our cases, the physician has agreed with the committee’s
recommendation. Should the attending physician disagree (or if the PWP
committee has not been able to reach
a consensus among themselves), the
case is presented to an emergency
meeting of the full ethics committee. If
full consensus still cannot be reached,
the protocol dictates that the Chief
Medical Officer (CMO) should make
the final decision on the treatment of
the patient. Although several cases
have gone to the full ethics committee,
we have never needed to call upon the
CMO to decide a case.

L

The hospital administration and attorneys approved our protocol, and we
have now used it for about 70 cases
over a period of five years (though
only about 50% have required that the
PWP committee be convened). Our
experience with the protocol has been
extremely positive. We have made
recommendations regarding code
status, surgeries, amputations, tracheostomies and PEG tubes, dialysis, and
chemotherapy. Sometimes we have
recommended aggressive treatments;
other times we have rejected them and
recommended comfort care. For those
patients who are expected to live, we
have recommended rehab and nursing
home placement and guardianship for
future decision-making. For those who
are not expected to live, we have rec-

ommended palliative care or hospice.
For further information on designing
a PWP protocol, see Hyun, I, Griggins,
C, Weiss, M, Robbins, D, Robichaud,
A and Daly, B. “When patients do not
have a proxy: A Procedure for medical
decision making when there is no one
to speak for the patient.” The Journal
of Clinical Ethics, Volume 17, no. 4
(2006), 323-330. You can also contact
me directly: Cynthia.griggins@uhhospitals.org
Cynthia Griggins, PhD, MA
Co-Director, Clinical Ethics Service
University Hospitals Case Medical
Center.

FOCUS: Educating Ethics Committee Members

ooking for ideas on how to
educate ethics committee
members at your facility? The
American Society for Bioethics and
Humanities (ASBH) has published an
Education Guide to help. In addition
to general content about clinical ethics and ethics consultation services,
the Guide includes the following
content domains, along with learning
objectives and suggested exercises
and readings related to each content
domain:
Core Ethical Issues Involving Adult
Patients
•

Decision-Making Capacity

•

Informed Consent

•

Surrogate Decision Making

•

•

Advance Care Planning and
Advance Directives

Ethical Issues Involving
Chronically Ill Infants,

•

Children and Adolescents

•

End-of-Life Decision-Making

•

•

Privacy and Confidentiality

Ethical Issues Involving
Adolescents

•

Pregnancy and Perinatal Issues

•

Dealing with “Difficult” Patients: Professional and Institutional Responses

•

Negotiating Difference and Accounting for Context

An Education Guide order form is
available at http://www.asbh.org.
The cost is $20 ($15 for ASBH
members).

Core Ethical Issues Involving Minors
•

General Framework for Minors
and Decision-Making

•

Ethical Issues Involving Newborns & Critically Ill Infants and
Children
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Case Presentation

O

ne of the regular features of this
Newsletter is the presentation
of a case considered by an ethics
committee and an analysis of the
ethical issues involved. Readers are
both encouraged to comment on the
case or analysis and to submit other
cases that their ethics committee has
dealt with. In all cases, identifying
information about patients and others
in the case should only be provided
with the permission of the patient.
Unless otherwise indicated, our
policy is not to identify the submitter
or institution. Cases and comments
should be sent to MHECN@law.
umaryland.edu, or MHECN, Law &
Health Care Program, University
of Maryland School of Law, 500 W.
Baltimore St., Baltimore, MD 21201.

This Case and the following
Commentaries are reprinted from
the Fall 1994 issue of the MAEC
Newsletter

Case from a
virginia Hospital

A

58 year old white male,
residing in a local homeless
shelter, exhibited suicidal
ideations and tendencies, and
was brought to the hospital
psychiatric center for evaluation,
and subsequently, was involuntarily
admitted. The patient did not have
any family or significant others. He
was not compliant, although not
violent. Having suicidal ideations, as
well as indications of several suicidal
attempts, the court found the patient to
be incompetent. The hospital sought
guardianship to assist in the decision
making process with regard to his
treatment.
After a medical workup, authorized
by the guardian and the hospital,
physicians discovered that the patient
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had terminal colon cancer. They also
determined that a powerful regimen
of chemotherapy might lengthen the
patient's life by twelve to eighteen
months. Unfortunately, this medication
is known to cause significant nausea
and vomiting, in addition to other
severe side effects. The patient refused
the medication, but was forced to
receive this treatment against his
will. The patient became delusional,
insisting that it was the chemotherapy
that was causing his cancer.
The nursing staff, physicians, and
guardian sought assistance from
the hospital ethics committee for
advice in the determination and
evaluation of ethical treatment
options. Some of the questions put
before this committee included: Is it
reasonable to discontinue treatment
that may preserve life, although at
a significantly reduced quality of
life? If so, does the patient's desire to
discontinue treatment carry any weight
given the court's adjudication of his
incompetency, his suicidal ideations
and his delusional state?

Comments From an
Attorney

T

his case raises both substantive
and procedural issues with
respect to the appropriate role
of the institution's ethics committee.
In addition, the case illustrates what
many in the field know all too well:
it is generally better to deal with
most bioethical issues at the earliest
opportunity, than to wait and do so
later.
The Initial Decision to Treat
Since this case concerns the
propriety of reversing a course of
treatment which was consented to,

not by, but on behalf of, the patient, a
decision to withdraw treatment should
be made on the same basis as was
the initial authorization. Therefore, a
discussion about the reasonableness
of a decision to discontinue
chemotherapy and what weight, if
any, should be accorded the patient's
refusal, must include an analysis
of the initial decision to commence
the chemotherapeutic regimen.
Understanding that initial decision
is of vital importance and the ethics
committee must, consequently, explore
this issue.
The forced administration of
chemotherapy is assumed to have been
authorized by the patient's guardian.
Inasmuch as many chemotherapy
regimens may involve experimental
treatment, the importance of obtaining
valid informed consent to such
treatment cannot be overlooked.
Presumably, the Committee will
discover that the guardian considered
the risks and benefits to the patient
from receiving chemotherapy and
concluded that the benefits outweighed
the risks, including the risk of
foregoing treatment. Hopefully, the
Committee will also determine that
the guardian specifically concluded
that the known adverse side effects
of treatment (as well as the unknown
risks) were outweighed by the benefits
associated with a possible increase in
the patient's life by 12 to 18 months.
One must wonder, however, whether
the patient, in a lucid interval would
concur in such assessment and arrive
at the same decision. A related issue
is whether the court order establishing
the guardianship contemplated and
enabled decisions of this magnitude
or whether the court intended only for
the guardian to make decisions with
regard to the patient's mental health

treatment. If the latter, it makes sense
to go back to court to enlarge the
surrogate's power in consideration of
the patient's condition.
The Decision to Discontinue
Treatment
Taking up the questions of the
reasonableness of discontinuing
treatment and whether to accord any
weight to the patient's apparent desire
to forego treatment, two responses
come to mind. Assuming that the
guardian acted within the scope of the
court's guardianship appointment and
in accordance with the patient's best
interests and gave valid and effective
informed consent to commence the
chemotherapy regimen, it seems not
only unreasonable, but inappropriate,
to discontinue a potentially life
lengthening course of treatment.
The autonomy of this patient has
been surrendered to the legally
designated surrogate decision maker,
the guardian. It makes no sense
to attribute decisional weight to
the patient's protestations because
such objections are not viewed as
emanating from a rational thought
process. Indeed, if a decision
were to be made to discontinue
chemotherapy without the guardian's
consent, what would be the source
of authority for any such decision.
In this context, therefore, the ethics
committee can only confirm that
informed consent to treatment was
obtained.
Best Interest of the Patient
On the other hand, this case may be
viewed as one in which the surrogate
decision maker—the guardian—
appears (to the treatment team) not
to be acting in the patient's best
interests and to the extent the patient's
preferences are at all discernible, the

treatment decision appears to be at
odds with such preferences. In this
situation, it seems appropriate for the
ethics committee to become involved
and explore whether the guardian's
decision making is centered on the
patient's best interests. It seems
unreasonable, however, for the
Committee to go beyond this role
by attempting to insert itself as the
decision maker on the question
of discontinuing treatment or the
arbiter between the guardian and
an incompetent ward. Assuming
the Committee has not been legally
empowered to wrest decision making
power from the patient or the patient's
surrogate, the Committee should
not affect a change in the treatment
course without the assent of the
guardian. As an attorney, I would be
quite uncomfortable with giving any
ethics committee that much rope.
If, after reviewing the facts, it is
evident to the Committee that the
guardian is not acting in the patient's
best interests, it would be appropriate
to challenge the guardian on this
issue. If the guardian is unwilling
to reassess his or her decision
making, the matter can always
be brought before the court—the
source of the guardian's authority.
Notwithstanding the patient's evident
desire to discontinue treatment, and
without a court order, it would be
unreasonable for the ethics committee
(or the hospital for that matter) to
discontinue treatment authorized by
the guardian. Nothing in the facts
presented indicate that the guardian's
authority to speak for the patient has
been curtailed or revoked.
If the guardian is willing to
reassess the decision to commence
chemotherapy, he or she should be
encouraged to ascertain, as much as

possible, the patient's basic values
and preferences. Failing an ability
to do that, I would recommend
that the guardian talk, not only to
medical oncologists, but also to
cancer patients currently undergoing
treatment, who are willing to share
their story, so that the guardian can
have a better appreciation for how
a rational patient responds to the
core question: is the adversity of
chemotherapy worth the expected
benefit?
Matthew D. Jenkins, J.D.
Partner, Hunton & Williams
Richmond, VA

Comments from a
Physician & Ethics
Committee Chair

T

he central question in this
case is whether the ethics
committee and the guardian,
acting on behalf of an incompetent
patient, lacking advance directives,
must adopt a vitalist principle:
prolong life at any cost. This case
is especially difficult as the patient
appears to reject life, given his
repeated attempts at suicide. Here,
the committee must not only wrestle
with the general problems of applying
a substituted judgment or best
interest test, but also with the choice
of whether to accept a mentally ill
patient's assessment that life is not
worth living, or to explicitly override
his wishes.
The Question of Competency
The courts deem suicidal patients
incompetent on the assumption that
their feelings reflect irrational and
profound depression — sane persons
would not choose to take their own
lives. In general, from the legal
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Case Presentation
Cont. from page 11
perspective, no consideration is given
to the possible causes of the patient's
feelings, nor to the likelihood that the
patient will ever achieve a condition
in which such feelings were not
present. Further, the state's interest
in life per se is thought to justify
paternalistic intervention when a
patient represents a danger to himself
(Childress, 1991; Greenberg, 1991).
While, ethically, incompetence based
on suicidality does not necessarily
reflect generalized incapacity to
make any and all medical decisions
(Buchanan & Brock, 1989), in
this case, the patient's mental state
directly affects a decision regarding
life-lengthening chemotherapy. To
the extent that his suicidal tendencies
are irrational, his capacity to decide
is impaired. In these circumstances,
the committee should not support the
patient's refusal of chemotherapy,
nor, using a best interest assessment,
consider the patient's apparent lack
of desire to live. Given the absence
of a pre-suicidal reference point,
recommending chemotherapy
seems the path of least resistance, as
well as, consistent with the ethical
commitment to treat and to prolong
life.
Best Interest of the Patient
Best interest judgments are
inherently problematic in our
American environment, which is
so heavily weighted toward respect
for individual preference, however
idiosyncratic (Gutheil & Appelbaum,
1983). Absent adequate information
about an individual's general values
or specific preferences, one must ask
what a "reasonable person" would do
in similar circumstances (Canterbury
v. Spence, 1972). One model for
such decision making proposes a
"community standard", invoking
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as the reference group the patient
population served by a particular
facility (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1993).
While an attractive concept, this idea
raises questions about how to identify
the appropriate reference population.
Hospitals typically do not serve
homogeneous patient groups. Our
own institution cares for incompetent,
isolated individuals of many ethnic
extractions, and socioeconomic or
educational backgrounds. In this case,
would the majority of patients in the
hospital, to which this patient was
involuntarily committed, share his
values and experience?
The patient's social situation might
also lead conscientious committee
members to mistrust their own
capacity to make a best interest
judgment on his behalf. A committee
of reasonably healthy, socially and
economically comfortable individuals
may realize that it is too easy for
them to accept a homeless, deluded
man's assessment of his life as not
worth living. To offset these social
biases and to avoid discriminating
against this vulnerable man,
the committee might, therefore,
recommend treatment. When this
concern is coupled with a mistrust of
suicidality as a competent expression
of will, the committee's safest moral
course is to choose treatment which
prolongs life, however compromised.
Another fact, which favors
compelled treatment, is that the
patient is homeless. This makes
it unlikely that he is insured. As a
result, even comfort care, through
a home or in-patient hospice, may
be unavailable. By insisting on
treatment, the committee may believe
it is ensuring the patient's access to
pain relief and comfort measures that
he might otherwise not receive.
Recommending chemotherapy

will, however, only temporarily solve
the committee's and the clinicians'
dilemma. This man's condition will
continue to deteriorate, necessitating
rescue efforts which are more and
more invasive, with increasingly
lower probabilities of success. As
a result, prior to the patient's death,
the committee will continue to face
questions about how much therapy he
should be forced to undergo.
A Mental Health Treatment
Approach
One alternative is for the committee
to recommend coercive treatment
with the goal of enhancing the
patient's capacity to make a decision
(thereby enhancing his autonomy),
rather than for the beneficent purpose
of cancer treatment (Buchanan &
Brock, 1989). Using this approach,
a vigorous trial of therapy, for
both his delusional state and
his depression, would precede a
decision regarding chemotherapy.
If he responds to treatment, a more
reasonable discussion of cancer
therapy will then be possible.
Further, when such patients are in
remission from their mental illness,
they can be encouraged to enact
advance directives in which they
might consent to re-hospitalization
and treatment during future relapses
(Buchanan & Brock, 1989). In
this case, an advance directive
would assist clinicians in both the
management of the patient's mental
illness, and his cancer treatment.
In some locales, it might be
possible to ameliorate the patient's
social situation, for instance, his
homelessness, reducing his suicidal
thoughts. However, rational decision
making for all patients is expected to
take into consideration the reality of
their familial and economic situation

as they contemplate treatment. Ethics
do not require the removal of all the
burdens that might make this man
unhappy or that lead him to refuse
treatment, but only to mitigate,
insofar as possible, demonstrably
irrational ideation about his illness, its
treatment, and its potential impact on
his future.
What if the patient does become
capable of understanding his disease,
its prognosis and the implications of
treatment, is no longer delusional,
demonstrates capacity to decide,
but remains pessimistic, even
suicidal, despite an appropriate
course of treatment? At this point,
the committee must consider that the
patient's emotional state is a fixed
condition of his life. If no social
or medical intervention is able to
reverse it, his hopelessness may not
be morally different than one patient's
irremediable pain or another's fear
of future disability. If the latters’
decisions about medical treatment
are respected, then it seems only
equitable to afford the same respect to
the choices of this patient.
But what if psychiatric treatment
fails to resolve the patient's delusions
and/or inability to understand his
condition and options? What if
adequate psychiatric treatment
cannot be enforced legally? In these
circumstances, the committee should
not recommend chemotherapy.
If he were not homeless, nor had a
history of suicidality, but was rather
an irreversibly incompetent, fiftyeight year old white male, without
advance directives or identifiable
surrogates, would we feel obliged
to choose chemotherapy on his
behalf? Here, the Saikewicz case
provides insight (Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v.

Saikewicz, 1977). Joseph Saikewicz,
at fifty-seven, had never been
competent due to mental retardation,
just as the patient in this case has
no discoverable competent past.
Similarly, Mr. Saikewicz faced
treatment for cancer. The decision
in the Saikewicz case, based on
compassion for the potential sufferer,
was to forego treatment. Likewise,
in the case of our fifty-eight year
old homeless man, neither our
misgivings about psychiatric illness
and suicidality, nor our collective
responsibility for this man's
homelessness should interfere with
compassionate decision making. The
ethics committee should, therefore,
recommend comfort care for this
patient, rejecting burdensome efforts
to prolong his life, which this patient
cannot comprehend.

Emanuel LL & Emanuel EJ (1993).
Decisions at the end of life: Guided
by communities of patients.
Hastings Center Report, 23 (5):614.
Gutheil TG. & Appelbaum PS
(1983). Substituted judgment: Best
interest in disguise. Hastings Center
Report, 13(3): 8-11.
Greenberg, DF (1991). Interference
with a Suicide Attempt, in
Biomedical Ethics, TA Mappes
& JS Zembaty (Eds.). New York:
McGraw-Hill. Inc., pp.326-330.
Superintendent of Belchertown
State School v. Saikewicz (1977),
373. Mass. 728. 370 N.E.2d 417.

Gail J. Povar, M.D.,M.P.H.
Chair, George Washington University
Hospital Ethics Committee
Clinical Professor of Medicine,
George Washington University
School of Medicine and Health
Sciences, Washington, D.C.
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Bioethics
Cont. from page 3
now is a good time for health care
providers, ethics committee members,
bioethicists, policy makers, and disability rights advocates to join forces
and identify common goals and how
to achieve them.
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
Ethics & Research Consultant,
Baltimore, MD
MHECN Program Coordinator
*The social model of disability views
the main causes of disability as being
rooted in people’s negative attitudes
toward persons with physical and
mental impairments, and programs
that keep persons with disabilities living in institutions, unemployed, and
isolated from meaningful work and
social life. The medical model views
disability as being caused merely by
the physical or mental impairments
themselves—impairments that can
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and should be treated or cured.
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SEPTEMBER

CALENDAR OF EVENTS

17

(12:30 - 2:00 PM) Complete Lives in the Balance. Guest Lecture Series at the Hoffberger Center for Professional
Ethics. Samuel Kerstein, Associate Professor of Philosophy at University of Maryland College Park, will examine
the foundations of Kantian Ethics. Student Center Bogomolny Room, University of Baltimore, 1420 N. Charles St.,
Baltimore, MD. For more information, visit http://www.ubalt.edu/template.cfm?page=3339.

18-19

Moral Distress in Health Care Symposium. Coast Plaza Hotel & Suites, 1763 Comox Street, Vancouver, BC. For
more information, visit http://www.nursing.ubc.ca/IPONS/.

21

The Science, Ethics and Politics of Vaccine Mandates. Sponsored by the Center for Bioethics of the University of
Pennsylvania, The Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, The University of Pennsylvania Health System, and the
Society for Health Care Epidemiology of America. BRB Auditorium, 421 Curie Boulevard, Philadelphia, PA. To
pre-register, contact Janice Pringle at jpringle@mail.med.upenn.edu or call 215-898-7136.

OCTOBER
Sept. 30 Oct. 2 A Need to Confess? Writing About the Healthcare Experience. 8TH Annual Quandaries in Health Care Conference.
The Given Institute of the University of Colorado, Aspen, Colorado. For more information, visit http://www.coloradobioethics.org/calendar_home.html.
3

Ethics of Invasive Brain Testing: Limits and Responsibilities. 19th International Cleveland Clinic Epilepsy Symposia. Cleveland, OH. For more information, visit http://www.ccf.org/neuroethics (click on NeuroEthics Symposia)

15-16

Open Hearts, Open Minds and Fair Minded Words: A Conference on Life and Choice in the Abortion Debate.
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. For more information, visit http://nohiddenmagenta.wordpress.
com/2010/02/14/open-hearts-open-minds-and-fair-minded-words/, or contact Kim Girman at
kgirman@princeton.edu.

21-24

Health and Community. The 12th Annual Meeting of the American Society for Bioethics &
Humanities (ASBH). Hilton San Diego Bayfront Hotel, San Diego, CA. For more information,
visit http://www.asbh.org.

NOVEMBER
TBA

End-of-life decision-making and Maryland Law - A Community Forum. Morning conference and afternoon roundtable discussions of Maryland's Health Care Decisions Act, focusing on issues related to withholding or withdrawing medically ineffective treatment. Baltimore, MD. Check MHECN's website for more details at http://www.law.
umaryland.edu/mhecn (click on Conferences).

19

(12:30 – 2 p.m.) Negative Duties and the New Harms. Guest Lecture Series at the Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics. Judith Lichtenberg, Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University, will speak about the challenges of
justice and charity in a diverse society. Business Center Room 003, University of Baltimore, 1420 N. Charles St.,
Baltimore, MD. For more information, visit http://www.ubalt.edu/template.cfm?page=3339.

19

New York’s 2010 Family Health Care Decisions Act and its Impact at the Hospitalized Patient’s Bedside. 2010
AMBI Clinical Ethics Conference sponsored by Albany Medical College, Albany, NY. For more information, visit
http://www.amc.edu/academic/bioethics/index.html.

DECEMBER
3-4

Transforming Humanity: Fantasy? Dream? Nightmare? Sponsored by the Penn Center for Bioethics, and the Penn
Center for Neuroscience & Society. For more information, contact John Schook at jshook@centerforinquiry,net,
716-636-4869.
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